Vavova, K. (2014a). Moral differences and moral skepticism. Philosophical Perspectives, 28, 302-333. Lackey, J. (2010a). A supporting view of the epistemic importance of differences of opinion. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, D.
Pritchard (Eds.), Social Epistemology (p. 298-325). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Beware of similarities, not differences. Working with my clients, I discovered that the best way to resolve a disagreement is to look for commonalities. If you focus on the differences, the space becomes wider, but if you look for what you have in common, it helps to close the gap. The next time you disagree, look for a point of agreement, even if you have to stretch. DiPaolo and Simpson (2016) argue that irrelevant influence is worrisome insofar as it is evidence of indoctrination, understood as circumvention or inhibition of the ability to think rationally.
Although this is often the case, indoctrination is clearly not necessary for deep disagreements. Perhaps the thoughtful conservative or liberal is aware of all the sociological facts of how partisan beliefs emerge. They do not need to be cut off from evidence or arguments to face the etiological challenge. 1. Look for understanding. People tend to be disunited if they don`t get along. When a party is so busy being heard and does not spend time understanding, the disagreement is just around the corner. If you understand that most of us are more alike than the rest of us, you can begin to tolerate and welcome another point of view – even appreciate. First, try to understand and appreciate. This does not mean that you must agree, only that you are open to hearing it.
It should be noted that the shift in focus of differences between isolated epistemic peers on the differences between a large number of individuals or between individuals who consider themselves representative of these groups helps to avoid worrying that two people rarely or never have access to the same evidence.